

# Gender As Social Institution\*

PATRICIA YANCEY MARTIN, *Florida State University*

---

## *Abstract*

*This article encourages sociologists to study gender as a social institution. Noting that scholars apply the institution concept to highly disparate phenomena, it reviews the history of the concept in twentieth-century sociology. The defining characteristic most commonly attributed to social institution is endurance (or persistence over time) while contemporary uses highlight practices, conflict, identity, power, and change. I identify twelve criteria for deciding whether any phenomenon is a social institution. I conclude that treating gender as an institution will improve gender scholarship and social theory generally, increase awareness of gender's profound sociality, offer a means of linking diverse theoretical and empirical work, and make gender's invisible dynamics and complex intersections with other institutions more apparent and subject to critical analysis and change.*

While rarely giving reasons for doing so, social scientists apply the term *social institution* to an amazing array of phenomena, including, for example, taxation and handshakes (Bellah et al. 1991), schools (Due et al. 2003), socialism (Parboteeah & Cullen 2003), mental hospitals (Goffman 1962), courtship (Clark 1997), community and property (Nisbet 1953), healing (Johnson 2000), sports (Andersen & Taylor 2000; Messner 1992), appellate courts (March & Olsen 1989), religion and marriage (Waite & Lehrer 2003), universities (Benschop & Brouns 2003), heterosexuality (Rogers & Garrett 2002), and "proliferating going concerns" (Gubrium & Holstein 2000, after Hughes [1942])

*\* This article is based on my presidential address delivered at the Southern Sociological Society meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana, in March 2003. Portions of it were delivered also at Keele University, Alma College, the College of William and Mary, the University of Mississippi, the College of Charleston, the University of South Alabama, the University of California at Davis, the University of Minnesota, and Trento University. For helping me improve the article, I thank Charles Camic, Judith Lorber, Myra Marx Ferree, Sharon Bird, Vinnie Roscigno, Don Tomaskovic-Devey, and John Reynolds, and for assisting with my talk, I thank John Reynolds and Chardie Baird. Direct correspondence to Patricia Yancey Martin, Department of Sociology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2270. E-mail: pmartin@coss.fsu.edu.*

1984). Such inclusiveness prompts questions about what these phenomena have in common.<sup>1</sup> What makes anything a social institution? Without explicit conceptualization or criteria, it is difficult to tell. “The only idea common to all usages of the term institution is that of some sort of establishment of relative permanence of a distinctly social sort,” according to Hughes ([1936] 1971:5; see also Hughes [1942] 1971). This comment, which Hughes made at the 1935 American Sociological Society meetings, is as apt today as it was then.<sup>2</sup> Hughes was acknowledging the failure of sociologists — and psychologists and economists and so on — to specify the meaning(s) of the social institution concept.

This article offers a conceptualization of institution that includes gender as well as other social realms that are typically included under this umbrella. To advance the thesis that gender is a social institution, I begin with an overview of the history of the concept. Conceptual definitions are not imbued with radical, reactionary, or other inherent meanings but they do have implications for the foci we choose and the types of analyses we undertake. I argue for framing gender as a social institution because doing so will foster critical analysis and insights, particularly about gender’s profound sociality, help us avoid reductionist thinking, and make gender more visible and susceptible to intentional change, including dismantling (Lorber 1994). Clarifying the parameters of the concept institution also contributes to social theory generally.

### The Term *Social Institution* in Twentieth-Century Sociology

Although this feature is only sometimes explicitly noted, the most universal theme in sociologists’ definition of *social institution* is endurance: An institution persists, it is not ephemeral. Other typical features that are implied or asserted are institutions’ external, macro, and constraining qualities and their equation with “major” societal realms such as family, religion, education, polity, and economy. Some authors say a particular set of institutions, those that meet “basic” societal “goals” or “needs,” is required for a society to exist; Berger and Luckmann (1966:55) describe society as “an agglomeration of institutions.”<sup>3</sup> Many imply that institutions are harmonious and benevolent (e.g., Searle 1969, 1995) although Balzer (2003) and Nisbet (1953), among others, disagree. Bellah and colleagues (1991) claim that institutions have a moral or ethical quality.<sup>4</sup> Some scholars apply the term *institutions* to formal organizations, for example, schools, nursing homes, universities. Some focus on what institutions *are*, others on what they *do*. Many represent institutions as internally consistent, conflict-free, fixed, and unchanging, yet a growing number focus on conflicts, internal

inconsistencies, and change as well as power, inequalities, privilege, and disadvantage as institutional features.<sup>5</sup>

Nearly all conceptions depict institutions as controlling, obligating, or inhibiting, although some also note their facilitating and empowering effects (see Berger & Luckmann 1966, Giddens 1984, and March & Olsen 1989 on this point). In the mid-twentieth century, many sociologists equated social institutions with ideas, norms, values, or beliefs with no attention to processes or practices. This narrow and static definition has been under challenge for some time by scholars who assert the centrality of practices in constituting social institutions (Giddens 1984; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina & Von Savigny 2001). Gender scholars, I am happy to say, were in the vanguard of this development (for example Acker 1992; Connell 1987; Lorber 1994; Reskin 1988; Ridgeway 1997; Risman 1998). Gender scholars have also advanced the notion that institutions are embodied; the “material body” is key. That is, the practices and interactions of “real” people with bodies that talk and act constitute social institutions, gender included (Acker 1990; Connell 1987; Lorber 1996, 1999; Rogers & Garrett 2002).

Relative to practices that constitute institutions, many contemporary scholars focus on rules, procedures, customs, and routines. March and Olsen (1989), for instance, define institutions as sets of rules and routines that are “constructed around clusters of appropriate activities” and “appropriate procedures” (24). Giddens (1984) acknowledges rules, procedures, and “enactment” in saying “Let us regard the rules of social life . . . as *techniques or generalizable procedures* [emphasis mine] applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices. . . . The most important aspects of structure are rules and resources recursively involved in institutions” (21–23). Similarly, Connell (1987) says *social institution* “classically signifies custom, routine, and repetition” (140). Relative to gender, Acker (1992) focuses on the concrete practices and processes that mobilize gender in multiple settings, and Ridgeway (2001) explicates links between gendered beliefs and practices (“legitimacy reactions”) that penalize women leaders. These scholars focus on practices and related interactional dynamics (see Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina & Von Savigny 2001; Schwalbe et al. 2000).

Many sociology encyclopedias, dictionaries, and introductory textbooks define institutions globally, with a vague sentence or two followed by a list of examples. Two sources reflect both this pattern and the older, idea-focused definition. The 2000 edition of the *Encyclopedia of Sociology* (Borgatta & Montgomery 2000) lacks an entry for institutions. Instead, readers who search for the term are told to “see American Society.” The American Society entry (Williams 2000) defines institutions in one sentence (142): “Institution here means a definite set of interrelated norms, beliefs, and values centered on important and recurrent social needs and activities.” *The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology* (Johnson 2000), an e-dictionary, defines institutions similarly:

Institutions are “an enduring set of ideas about how to accomplish goals generally recognized as important in a society” (157). Johnson’s invocation of “ideas,” like Williams’s of “norms, beliefs, and values,” implies that institutions are *subjective* (see below) rather than material or behavioral in content. Johnson’s use of the term *enduring* implies a time element, as does Williams’s use of the term *recurrent*, although neither discusses time explicitly. Neither says where goals or “recurrent social needs” come from nor how their importance is determined. Both fail to mention practices or acknowledge that institutions are conflicted, dynamic, and changing. Finally, both fail to address the relationship of individuals to institutions.

The examples listed by these sources, also typical, include “family and kinship, social stratification, economic system, the polity, education, and religion” (Williams 2000:142) and “family, religious, economic, educational, healing, and political institutions” (Johnson 2000:157). Giddens (1984) objects to equating institutions with such “substantive” lists because doing so implies that the phenomena are universal, necessary, and unchanging and, equally troublesome, that they stand “outside human agency.” As I explain later, I share Giddens’s concern.

#### EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONCEPTIONS

In a commentary on a newly discovered and unpublished manuscript by Parsons (written in the 1930s but not published until 1990), Charles Camic (1990) addresses Parsons’s influence in shifting the concept of social institutions away from behavior and practices toward a “subjective only” definition. According to Camic, *social institution* was a key concept for “anthropologists, political theorists, economists, sociologists and even psychologists” in the early twentieth century (1990:315). However, simultaneous with Parsons’s rising influence on U.S. sociology, the meanings scholars attached to the institution concept became less consistent than they had been earlier.

Among the early twentieth century scholars who touted the concept’s utility for understanding society were economist Walton Hamilton (1932) and sociologists Charles Horton Cooley ([1909] 1962), L.T. Hobhouse ([1924] 1966), and William Graham Sumner ([1906] 1979). Hamilton, one of Parsons’s teachers at Amherst College, defined an institution as a complex phenomenon with multiple facets: “‘a cluster of social usages,’ possessing some ‘prevalence and permanence,’ ‘embedded in the habits of a group of people or the customs of a people’ and accompanied by formal and informal ‘sanctions’ that ‘function’ to ‘fix the confines of and impose form upon the activities of human beings’” (Hamilton 1932:84 as cited in Camic 1990:316). According to Camic, this formulation was “not idiosyncratic” but was widely embraced, by for example Cooley, Hobhouse, and Sumner who viewed institutions as central to sociology’s

domain. These scholars focused on the practices (or usages) aspect of institutions, their endurance over time, and their constraining influence on societal members. That is, institutions were “recognized and established usages governing [social] relations (in conjunction with the ‘principles’ and ‘organization’ of those usages)” (cited in Camic 1990:316 from Hobhouse [1924] 1966:49); “usages that are crystallize[d and] enduring” (cited in Camic 1990:316 from Cooley [1909] 1962:313); and usages that are “endowed with a coercive and inhibitive force” (cited in Camic 1990:316 from Sumner [1906] 1979:67). Institutions were framed as organized, persisting, and “behavioral,” not only ideational or normative.

According to Camic (1990:317), MacIver “codified” these themes when he argued that social institutions are one of two “great classes [of] social fact,” the other being social relations. For MacIver, institutions were “forms of social activity” or “the established forms or conditions [e.g., rules] of procedure characteristic of group activity” (cited in Camic 1990:317 from MacIver 1928:7, 1936:16–17). MacIver said institutions entail activities, or practices, that inform and enable members about how to get things done. They also maintain order by encouraging or requiring some activities and discouraging or forbidding others. He noted also that institutions persist over time, and thus he made their time element explicit. These principles were “virtually axiomatic among sociologists” by the 1930s, Camic (1990:317) says.

Talcott Parsons, whose influence on U.S. sociology in the twentieth century was extensive, rejected MacIver’s inclusion of the “forms of social activity/procedures” so as to “preserve” the concept for sociology. Parsons was responding to claims by psychologists and behaviorists that “the habitual behavior of individuals should be viewed as units of biology, chemistry and other natural sciences,” not sociology (Camic 1990:316–17).<sup>6</sup> Parsons responded by differentiating the notion of institutions into “uniform modes of behavior and forms of relationship” and “the idea of sanction” and, then, relinquishing the former to the behaviorists and retaining the latter for sociology. The former became equated with an “objective” approach to institutions (e.g., MacIver’s and his predecessors) and the latter with the “subjective” approach favored by Parsons. This step equated an institution with “the normative rules that underlie it,” setting “aside modes of behavior and forms of relationship” and “leaving behind much of what otherwise might have been regarded as these thinkers’ institutional analysis” (Camic 1990:317–18).<sup>7</sup>

[When Parsons] tries to counteract behaviorist reductionism by grounding institutions in common ultimate values, much of what sociologists and institutionalists of his time were pointing to with the term institution — diverse forms of social activity, specific prescribed usages, historically-changing economic, political, religious, familial and other practices, and their variable sources simply disappears. (Camic 1990:318)

Parsons's actions fostered confusion that is evident today in publications as well as Ph.D. preliminary exams where students labor (and fail) to equate institutions with "norms, beliefs, and ideas" and organizations with "practices and structure," as if institutions lack practices and structure and organizations lack norms, beliefs, and ideas. While his conception allowed societal members to have agency in shaping the norms, beliefs, and values that constrain them, Parsons's rejection of behavior and practices removed the dynamics by which change is produced. As a result, social institutions suggested a society where conformity and stasis are usual and conflict and change are unusual.

#### LATER TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONCEPTIONS

Not everyone agreed with Parsons. Nisbet (1953) critiqued sociologists' definition of institutions that ignored people; represented each institution as separate from all others; suggested an ahistorical picture; depicted institutions as free of conflict, inconsistencies, and change; and failed to address their origins (88–90). Nisbet called for more attention to human agency in creating and changing social institutions and for scholars to frame institutions as rife with conflict, incoherence, and change. Conflict *within* as well as *between* institutions is pervasive, he argued (87–88), and these dynamics should be explored. (See Roscigno 2000 on interinstitutional dynamics.)

Berger and Luckmann (1966) challenged prevailing definitions by reinstating the "objective" aspects of institutional phenomena and linking their "subjective" and "objective" qualities. Rejecting the implications of a functionalist view of institutions as "positive" or necessary, they made the issues of power and domination key to institutional dynamics. Focusing on institutions' coercive powers, Berger and Luckmann highlighted *legitimation* dynamics wherein powerful elites claim and justify to a broader social audience the rightness and necessity of institutional arrangements that work to their benefit. Here institutions are actively constructed, as human products, claiming that a repeated action "frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be reproduced with an economy of effort and which, *ipso facto*, is apprehended by its performer as that pattern. Habitualization [the repetition of a pattern] . . . implies that the action in question may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effect" (1966:52–53). Although not inevitably, processes of habitualization often develop into institutions.

Berger and Luckmann emphasized both *historicity* and *control*. "Institutions always have a history, of which they are the products" (1966:54); they do not develop spontaneously in response to "societal needs or goals." Institutions have a "controlling characteristic." "To say that a segment of human activity has been institutionalized is . . . to say that this segment of human activity has been subsumed under social control" (55). Their emphasis on the controlling

effect(s) of institutions resonates with work from decades earlier by Cooley, Hamilton, and MacIver. Berger and Luckmann also insisted that institutions span an extensive amount of time, a point with which contemporary theorists agree.

Giddens (1984) extends this prior work by making recursive human practices key to the constitution of institutions. Social institutions are recursive human practices with the greatest time and space distancing. Recursive human practices are not repeated identically each time; through recursive human practices, group members constitute and reconstitute social institutions. In Giddens's view, "Institutions are . . . the more enduring features of social life . . . , the human practices that last longest and extend farthest in geographic space — the most "temporally long-established and spatially widespread" (23, 301). Only recursive practices that last a long time and extend far in space should be deemed institutions.

Time's importance to a conception of institutions is reflected in Giddens's (1984) distinction between individuals' repetitive daily routines and life span experiences and the long "duree" (endurance) of institutional time.

The events and routines of daily life do not have a one-way flow to them; they are recursive or repetitive. . . . [T]he routines . . . are formed in terms of the interaction of passing (but continually returning) days and seasons. Daily life has a duration, a flow, but it does not lead anywhere; the very adjective "day-to-day" and its synonyms indicate that time here is constituted only in repetition. The life of the individual, by contrast, is not only finite but irreversible, 'being towards death.' Time in this case is the time of the body . . . and the life cycle is really a concept that belongs to the succession of generations and thus to a third dimension of temporality. . . . This [third dimension] is the 'supra-individual' duree of the long-term existence of institutions, the long duree of institutional time. (35)

As already noted, Giddens objects to defining social institutions *substantively* (1984:34), that is, as family, education, religion, and so on — and he opposes a strict micro–macro distinction between individuals and institutions, saying it suggests that institutions are detached from or only external to people. Rather, institutions are "internalized" by the human actors who constitute them. While institutions are simultaneously constraining and enabling, Giddens places more emphasis than do many others on internalization and enablement.

Unique among authors reviewed so far, Giddens instates the body and embodiment in institutional dynamics, affirming the significance of bodies that materially exist and consequentially do things, a theme developed further by Connell (1987) in relation to gender and sexuality (see also Acker 1990; Lorber 1999). People have bodies that do things via physical and communicative action and, in acting, constitute themselves and society, with *structuration* referring to the simultaneous constitution of "agents" and "structures" (Giddens 1984:25–

26). Giddens acknowledges people as situated actors who actively constitute and reconstitute social institutions and, in so doing, suggests where institutions “come from” and how they are maintained, resisted, and changed.

### Toward (Re)Defining Social Institution

Building on the above review and other works to be noted shortly, I identify criteria for defining social institutions and, after reviewing them, present the case for gender as a social institution. The features of social institutions are as follows.

1. *Institutions are profoundly social; they are characteristic of groups.* Institutions are constituted by collectivities of people who associate with each other extensively and, through interaction, develop recursive practices and associated meanings.
2. *Institutions endure/persist across extensive time and geographic space.* Social institutions have a history that can be studied (e.g., changes in gender from the 1700s to 1990s in the U.S.). In accord with Giddens (1984), only phenomena with *extensive* time and space *distanciation* are usefully viewed as social institutions.<sup>8</sup>
3. *Institutions entail distinct social practices that recur* (Giddens 1984), *recycle* (Connell 1987), *or are repeated (over time) by group members.* Through acting or doing, individually and collectively, group members constitute institutions. Distinctive practices differentiate institutions from each other. Barnes (2001) equates social institutions with practices, and Tuomela (2003:123) views social institutions as “norm-governed social *practices*” (also Searle 1969, 1995). Even Bellah and colleagues (1991:40), who generally favor a “subjective”/Parsonian view, acknowledge that institutions are “*patterns of social activity* that give shape to collective and individual experience” [emphasis in this and the preceding quote is mine]. Practices that recur over extensive spans of time and geography are defining features of social institutions and the means by which they are constituted (Connell 1987; Giddens 1984). Relative to gender, people “do gender” in the street, on the subway, in their homes and workplaces, individually and collectively (Acker 1990, 1992; Britton 2003; Martin 2003; Pierce 1995; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1999; West & Zimmerman 1987). In many contexts and in varied ways, their practices constitute and reconstitute the gender institution.
4. *Institutions both constrain and facilitate behavior/actions by societal/group members.* Institutions constrain group members by forbidding some alternatives and choices of actions and empower them by making some

alternatives and choices of action possible and preferable (March & Olsen 1989).

5. *Institutions have social positions and relations that are characterized by particular expectations, rules/norms, and procedures.* An institution entails a set of social positions that are interrelated, “make sense,” and are enacted relative to each other. For instance, gender has boy, girl, woman, and man. Religion has lay member, pastor/priest/rabbi/ayatollah, acolyte, elder, deacon, worshiper, and so on. The behavior of incumbents to these positions is shaped by widely shared cultural rules or norms.

6. *Institutions are constituted and reconstituted by embodied agents.* Institutions exist because embodied agents, societal members with material bodies, enact practices to constitute them. Institutions persist because embodied agents continually constitute them, although in varying ways (see points 9 and 10). The *material body* is a critical element in the social relations and dynamics of institutions and, according to Connell (1987), its influence must be studied without invoking biological reductionism or other essentialist interpretations (also Giddens 1984; Lorber 1994).

7. *Institutions are internalized by group members as identities and selves and they are displayed as personalities.* Institutions are not only external to individuals. Members’ experiences within — with *and* in — institutions become incorporated into their identities and selves as members identify with their positions, the practices they enact, and the positions they occupy. Through this dynamic, institutional phenomena acquire personal meaning and significance (Connell 1987).

8. *Institutions have a legitimating ideology* that proclaims the rightness and necessity of their arrangements, practices, and social relations. Legitimizing ideology that justifies institutional practices and social relations is created by elites who benefit from the arrangements and practices they valorize (Berger & Luckmann 1966). Gender ideology is widely known and generally believed.

9. *Institutions are inconsistent, contradictory, and rife with conflict.* Despite their persistence, institutions are not highly coherent or integrated. They entail many diverse practices, some of which conflict with others. Due to inconsistencies and internal conflicts, struggles among group members over particular practices are common, not rare.

10. *Institutions continuously change.* Related to the prior criterion, and paradoxically contrary to the second criterion about endurance, institutional relations and practices are in flux. One reason is that present practices modify past practices (Connell 1987) and produce slightly, sometimes vastly, altered practices. Also, the interdependence of institutions means that changes in one institution “unsettle” conditions and practices in other institutions, causing

disruption (Nisbet 1953; Roscigno 2000). Finally, over time, old institutions die out and new ones are constituted. For example, slavery is mostly relegated to the past, whereas the mass media institution is a recent creation. Attention to dynamics not only within but between institutions, for example, between gender and the media, is required by this criterion (see Grindstaff 2002).

11. *Institutions are organized in accord with and permeated by power.* Institutional positions and practices allocate privilege and advantages to incumbents of some social positions and subordination and disadvantages to others. Power differentials are manifest in the recursive practices that orient, constrain, and facilitate members' behavior. Social positions that are highly valorized provide incumbents with power over incumbents of less valorized positions. I agree with Stephen Lukes (1974) that organization *per se* creates power (cf. Balzer 2003). Wherever social practices and relations are "organized," as they are in institutions, power differences and dynamics are at play.

12. *Institutions and individuals mutually constitute each other; they are not separable into macro and micro phenomena.* Giddens (1984; also Nisbet 1953) rejects the claim that institutions are macro and individuals are micro, arguing that this distinction distorts their mutual constitution and implies that institutions are only external rather than also internalized (criterion 7). It also implies that they are not susceptible to human agency (criterion 3). This criterion rejects the premises that institutions are big and individuals are small and that institutions are separate from individuals.

I note two other points about social institutions. One is their interdependence. The other is the role of the state. No institution is totally separate from others; each links to others, often extensively (Roscigno 2000). For example, gender and sexuality are intertwined — as are gender and family, gender and work/the economy, gender and religion — but so are family and the polity/state, family and the economy, economy and the polity/state, and education and the polity/state, and so forth (Acker 1992). Assuming that any institution is separate from others will produce flawed understanding (Nisbet 1953). Interinstitutional influences are not only pervasive, they change over time. Thus, changes in gender in accord with second-wave feminism have "unsettled" the family institution, the military, and religion, among other institutions, by challenging the legitimacy of girls' and women's subordination (Connell 1987; Gerson 2002; Katzenstein 1998). In other historical eras, these institutions more extensively "unsettled" gender.

Second, institutions are often entwined with the state. In western societies, for instance, all other institutions are linked to the state — as government, polity, legislation/regulations — which itself is an institution (March & Olsen 1989). States have power over other institutions when they codify particular practices into law and enforce them through the police, the military, the courts, and — more informally, although by no means less importantly — rhetoric

and framing of national concerns and ideology. The state has, for example, codified many aspects of gender into laws or regulations. For instance, it requires a birth certificate and driver's license to list a person's gender. It prohibited women's right to vote in national elections until the 19th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It gave employers the right to pay women less, offering unequal pay for equal work, until the national Equal Pay Act was passed into law in 1963. Laws both reflect and create gender inequality when they lend state authority to gender institution practices by assigning women to an inferior status as citizens and workers. In recent years, at the prompting of women's movement mobilization, the state has acted to enhance women's rights and opportunities (Ferree & Hess 2000). Attempts to understand gender without taking into account the state/polity and other institutions will produce flawed results, as will any attempt to understand other institutions without taking gender into account (Acker 1992; Lorber 1994).

### Gender As Social Institution

Connell and Lorber, in the vanguard of asserting gender's institutional character (also Acker 1992), want to stop the widespread reduction of gender to individual, psychological, biological, or other micro phenomena in scholarship and popular culture. Toward this end, Connell (1987) affirms gender's variegated qualities and emphasizes its profound sociality, the centrality of the material body, and the centrality of practice/practicing. (Connell's *gender order* concept is compatible with if not equivalent to my conception of gender institution.) Framing gender in terms of its collective, institutional, and historical properties depicts it more accurately and renders it more accessible to sociological analysis:

In common-sense understanding gender is a property of individual people. When biological determinism is abandoned, gender is still seen in terms of socially produced individual character. It is a considerable leap to think of *gender as being also a property of collectivities, institutions, and historical processes* [emphasis mine]. This view is . . . required by evidence and experience. . . . There are gender phenomena of major importance which simply cannot be grasped as properties of individuals, however much properties of individuals are implicated in them. (Connell 1987:139)

Like Giddens, Connell views people as inside rather than outside institutionalization processes, and institutions as facilitating as well as constraining human practice. Connell valorizes practices and practicing even more than Giddens does, however. In a section titled "towards a practice-based theory," Connell (1987) explains how the *practices of gender* relate to the *structures of gender*. The gender order is constantly transformed through practice, with practice and structure "cyclically" related over time. To Connell,

cyclical practices form the core of institutions, with institutionalization representing the conditions that make cyclical practice possible:

Practice responds to a situation and transforms that situation. To describe structure is to specify what it is in the situation that constrains . . . practice. Since the consequence of practice is a transformed situation which is the object of new practice, “structure” specifies the way practice (over time) constrains practice. (95)

The [gender] process . . . is strictly social and gender is a phenomenon within sociality. . . . [C]yclical practice . . . is what is meant by an institution. The process of “institutionalization” . . . is the creation of conditions that make cyclical practice probable. (140)

Connell also emphasizes historicity, agency, and power — foci that are reflected in the criteria I outlined above. Historicity means that gender varies over time and is susceptible to human agency; gender is *not* a *transhistorical structure* that remains the same across time because of the “sexual dichotomy of bodies” (Connell 1987:64). “The idea of historicity is about change produced by human practice, about people being inside the process” (143–44). People make the social world; they do not only react to it. “To interpret social relations as natural is, fundamentally, to suppress their historicity. Naturalization (claims that something is natural) is a political act” (Connell 1987:246).

Like Giddens, Connell affirms the body’s place and significance in social relations, acknowledging it as the material basis for individual being(s). The body is there, the body acts and interacts, the body transforms and is transformed. Gender “does things” with and to bodies but gender is not explainable by or reducible to the body. Connell decries reducing gender to bodily imperatives but, at the same time, views efforts to understand gender — or any institution — without taking the material body into account as flawed (see also Acker 1990).<sup>9</sup>

As to power, Connell claims that recent changes in the gender order are causing “a crisis of institutionalization” that has weakened the ability of the state to sustain the legitimacy of men’s power over women in the form of domestic patriarchy (159–60). Women’s push for equality has undermined the state’s ability to enforce a family form that gives men authority over women and assures them of women’s domestic services.<sup>10</sup> Gerson’s (2002) research affirms this view, reporting that many more women than men want an equal division of labor at home and work (90% of women, 40% of men). Gerson’s data indicate to her a disjuncture between the institutions of family and work; to Connell they indicate a disjuncture between the institutions of family, gender, and state; and to me they indicate a disjuncture between the institutions of family, state, work/economy, and gender. Differentiating among these distinctive, although intertwined, institutions improves scholars’ ability to identify gender’s influences on other institutions and their influences on it. It

also avoids assuming that gender is “at play” only in face-to-face or primary group contexts, a common practice among scholars, including sociologists (see Acker 1992 and Risman 1998 on this point).

Lorber (1994) underscores gender’s fundamental sociality, origins in human society, and persistence through human agency and interaction.<sup>11</sup> In claiming gender is an institution “in its own right” (1), Lorber says gender affects individual lives and social interaction, has a history that can be traced, is a structure that can be examined, has changed in ways that can be researched, establishes expectations for individuals, orders social processes, is willingly incorporated into identities or selves, and is built into the major social organizations of society. In making this case, she calls gender’s “naturalness and . . . inevitability into question” (5).

Conceptualizing gender as a social institution is necessary to make *the origins and perpetuation of gender* explicit. Doing so increases awareness of gender’s sociality and susceptibility to human agency and has the effect of undermining popular presumptions that gender is somehow “natural,” biological, and essential (Lorber 1994). “The prime paradox of gender is that in order to dismantle the institution you must first make it . . . visible” (Lorber 1994:10). Lorber’s “believing is seeing” paradox refers to the power of gender ideology to shape perceptions and expectations, even in the face of contrary evidence. For instance, “believing” that women and men are fundamentally different leads people to “see” them as different even when “the facts” show their commonalities. For gender to be constituted differently, and potentially “dismantled,” its complex and multifaceted character must be made visible. Framing gender as a social institution is a step toward this end.<sup>12</sup>

### Gender As Social Institution? The Utility

In my judgment, gender qualifies as an institution on all 12 criteria, showing itself as institutional as any other social phenomenon. I invite scholars to contest this recommendation, furthermore, because even efforts that produce a negative outcome — gender fails to *qualify* — will instruct us about institutions generally and gender in particular. Rather than going criterion by criterion to make this case, I review some key benefits of framing gender as an institution. Doing so underscores gender’s sociality; directs attention to practices, practicing, and interaction; requires attention to power; re-instates the material body; acknowledges disjunctures, conflicts, and change; and challenges micro–macro dualisms.

AFFIRMS GENDER'S SOCIALITY

While “traditional” institutions like the family, economy, and polity are accepted as “distinctly social” in character (Hughes [1936] 1971), gender is not. Gender is reduced by many scholars and by popular culture to biology — genes, hormones, morphology — and psychology in ways that deny its sociality and susceptibility to social construction. Thus, insistence on gender’s collectivity, sociality, and fluidity are required to make the case for its institutional status. Attention to its collective character and historical and geographical variations will, I believe, affirm its susceptibility to human agency and its changes and variations over time. Hansen’s (1994) study of gender in nineteenth-century New England shows that historical analysis of gender often produces astereotypical results (cf. Simon & Nath 2004). Using letters, diaries, and other archival documents, Hansen found that men as well as women made quilts, wrote passionate letters to each other without implicating sexuality, and developed friendships across races and classes as well as genders. Evidence of such “concrete relations and practices” (Acker 1992) often fails to show a dualistic “separate worlds” view of gender that popular cultural beliefs — Lorber’s “believing is seeing” — and some sociological theories embrace.<sup>13</sup>

DIRECTS ATTENTION TO PRACTICES

Sociologists have gone far in transcending the static concepts of “ascribed status” and sex roles (and its variant, gender roles), with gender scholars in the forefront of this development. Their analysis of doing, displaying, strategically asserting, performing, mobilizing, and maneuvering relative to gender has produced important insights into the practices that constitute the gender institution (Bird & Sokolofski 2004; Kondo 1990; Leidner 1991; Pierce 1995; Schippers 2002; Thorne 1993; West & Fenstermaker 1995; West & Zimmerman 1987). Social theorists generally are reinstating practice at the heart of social theory and gender scholars are pathbreakers in this development. Focusing on practices counters the tendency to reify gender as fixed or as accomplished primarily through socialization of the young. Seeing gender as continuously constituted encourages sociologists and societal members alike to view gender as the product of active human agents who can change gender as well as other social institutions.

Gender institution practices need to be explored in both their unreflexive and reflexive forms, furthermore (Ahearn 2000; Giddens 1984; Martin 2003). According to Giddens (1984), people act with purpose, but the effects of their actions are often unintended. He uses an example of language. When one uses English to ask for a bottle of wine in Italy, the intention is to obtain a bottle of wine. But in speaking English instead of Italian, speakers — in practice — contribute to the hegemony of English worldwide, irrespective of their

intentions. Similarly, people who practice gender at work without intending to can and do produce harm. I have seen many instances of this dynamic in my fieldwork, when for example men unreflexively behave in ways that women perceive, and experience, as about masculinity/ies (Martin 1996, 2001, 2003).<sup>14</sup>

#### HIGHLIGHTS POWER

Social organization entails power because it produces differences that allocate resources, privilege, and opportunities differentially (Balzer 2003; Lukes 1974). The structuring of behavior through recursive practices privileges some practices over others, some practitioners over others. A conception of gender as an institution requires attention to power (Acker 1992). To ignore power is to fail to understand the hows and whys of “structures of inequality and exploitation” (Collins 1998:150). Competing interests exist. Acknowledging the “complexities within historically constructed groups as well as those characterizing relations among such groups” (Collins 1998:152–54) helps us discover how gender, race/ethnicity, class, sexuality, and other “axes of difference” reflect power, singly and in combination.

#### REINSTATES THE MATERIAL BODY

All institutions are embodied. Someone works/is working; someone votes; someone leads armies. Events do not happen on their own. People with bodies do things, physically and narratively; they shoot guns, allocate funds, offer praise or criticism, use sexist language, hug and hit people. Practices are embodied. We even “do personality” by displaying ourselves and identities through particular forms of speech and behavior (Connell 1987). This criterion requires scholars to take the body into account. Biology exists; its effects and contours are relevant to gender, at least in some regards. Yet our obligation as sociologists is to understand gender as a *social phenomenon*, meaning on its own terms, while avoiding reductionist and reified assumptions.

#### ACKNOWLEDGES DISJUNCTURES, CONFLICTS, AND CHANGE.

Gender is not integrated or coherent in ways that “serve an important function” or “fulfill a societal need,” but then, in my view, neither is any other social institution. Like all institutions, gender is a product of people who occupy different positions and have conflicting identities and interests. Conflicts, inconsistency, and change are thus endemic to the gender institution as to others. Second-wave feminism — a gender institution dynamic since the late 1960s — has challenged or “unsettled” how gender is practiced in other institutions — the legal system, the educational system, marriage/home/family, the workplace, social class, heterosexuality, the military. Gender has “bumped

against” these institutions, causing conflict and pressuring them to change (Nisbet 1953). Framing gender as a social institution shows how change is both resisted and accomplished over time.

#### CHALLENGES MACRO–MICRO SEPARATION

Although large social entities such as corporations or the state should not be reduced to the actions of individuals, individuals’ agency is involved in their production. Framing gender as an institution encourages analysis of how institutions and individuals mutually constitute each other, discouraging division of them into macro and micro realms (Giddens 1984; Risman 1998). When Tom, a corporate vice president, asks his colleague Betsy, also a vice president, to answer a telephone that is ringing in a nearby office, he performs a micro act informed by the gender institution (see Martin 2003 for more on this event). His behavior makes no sense relative to rational-technical bureaucracy where relations based on office (or official position) tell Tom it is inappropriate to instruct a co-vice president to answer a telephone. However, his behavior makes perfect sense in light of the kind of masculinity that tells men and boys they have a right to assistance from women (on masculinities, see Collinson & Hearn 1994; Messerschmidt 2000; Messner 1992). Tom “knows” about this right because of his experiences within gender, as does Betsy who, to her chagrin, answered the phone. In treating Betsy as a woman rather than as a vice president, Tom’s action both reflected and constituted gender. Analysis of how micro individual/interactional acts and the “long duree of institution” mutually constitute each other needs attention from gender scholars and institutional scholars generally.

#### Discussion and Conclusions

I favor framing gender as a social institution because I believe it qualifies and because sociological analysis will be enhanced by it. Sociology needs a dynamic and profoundly social conception of gender and it needs a clearer conception of social institution. This article is a starting point for both.

Framing gender as an institution is beneficial in drawing attention to its multiple features — ideology, practices, constraints, conflicts, power — and affirming its complexities and multifacetedness. Recognition of this condition assures scholars that they need not “study it all” and, relatedly, gives those who work only on particular institutional features a framework for connecting their efforts to the bigger picture. I hope it will also diminish debates about what gender “really” is and encourage scholars to resist equating gender with only some of its features or dynamics (cf. Hawkesworth 1997, who does both). Scholars who accuse each other of studying the “wrong” aspect or using the

“wrong” theoretical or methodological approach — for example, discourse analysis, poststructuralism, positivism — will be prompted, I hope, to accept that diverse perspectives are needed to comprehend diverse phenomena.

Parsons’s influence requires comment. Although Parsons was attempting to “save” the institution concept for sociology, hindsight suggests that he erred. In relinquishing its behavioral aspects and restricting institution to “subjective” values, beliefs, and norms, Parsons placed sociology in a box relative to dynamics and change, muddled the definition for future generations, and limited the concept’s utility for sociological analysis. Sociologists are and have been struggling for years to transcend his sex roles and other static notions (Acker 1992). As one reviewer of my article noted, Parsons’s conception of social institutions was simply wrong, and we need to bury that ghost.

Will sociologists embrace the claim that gender is a social institution? Those who accept a “subjective” or “substantive” definition of institution are unlikely to. Likewise, gender scholars who view “real” institutions as universal, fixed, consistent, or unchanging will resist because it would require them to deny research affirming gender’s current fluidity and historical variations (Leidner 1991; Thorne 1993). Although some definitions of institutions depict them as fixed or harmonious, current conceptions, including the one I favor, focus on change and highlight inconsistencies, disjunctures, and conflicts of power. Another possible objection is that gender fails to qualify as an institution because it is done *only in accord with other institutions*. Scholars who make this claim disqualify gender because it “cannot stand alone,” separately from the family, polity, economy/workplace, religion/church, and so on. This concern is unjustified in two respects. First, no institution “stands alone” and, second, gender is done everywhere, “inside” other institutions but “outside” them also. Extensive research evidence shows that “gender is done” nearly everywhere, most of the time, including on the streets, in elevators, on subways, on cruise ships — not “only” in families, churches, politics, and workplaces (Acker 1992; Collinson & Hearn 1994; Lorber 1994; Maier & Messerschmidt 1998; West & Zimmerman 1987).<sup>15</sup>

How is it possible for institutions to both endure and change? Individuals resist pressures associated with institutional rules, customs, and procedures but doing so generally fails to change the institution in a major way. Connell (1987) and Lorber (1994) say, with others, that institutional change is produced by focused collective action, rarely by individual resistance. Successes of the past 40 years in women’s rights and opportunities surely show the accuracy of that claim. Changes can be undone, however, and nothing suggests that they are permanent. Still, they were effected through collective agency that can and may be mobilized again. Indeed, changes in one institution are so intertwined with changes in others that resistance to going backward may be more widespread and diverse than the efforts to make the changes were initially.

Societal members regularly “use gender” to construct the social relations and dynamics of other institutions. Doing so does not diminish gender’s institutional status. On the contrary, the borrowing of gendered expectations to create and legitimate social relations in all or most other institutions is a clear indicator of its institutional power. Martin and Knopoff (1997) show how justifiers of modern bureaucracies used gender ideology about women, femininity, and (ir)rationality to exclude women’s participation and to valorize attributes and practices associated with men and masculinities. Others show how gender ideology and practices in eighteenth-century England made offspring the property of fathers and gave wives’ wealth to their husbands, fathers, or brothers. Families are constituted in large measure with gender, but so too are religion, politics/law, education, the economy/labor markets/workplaces, and welfare (Fobes 2004; Kenney 1996; Martin, Reynolds & Keith 2002; McGinley 2004; Pierce 1995; Quadagno & Fobes 1995; Rosenfeld 2002; Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs 2002). Without question, other institutional spheres “use gender” to construct (some) practices, social relations, rules, and procedures. Acker (1992:566) asks us how the major institutions of society would look if women’s subordination and exclusion had not been “built into ordinary institutional functioning.” The problem is, according to Acker, that except for the family, sociological conceptions of other institutions have represented them as gender-free in ways that have obscured their gendered qualities and dynamics (568). Gender is handy for such uses primarily because of its extensive pervasiveness and intertwining with other social realms (Kruger & Levy 2001; Mennino & Brayfield 2002; Reskin 2003; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1999; Rosenfeld 2002).

Gender is no more foundational than any other institution, but neither are other institutions more foundational than gender. Framing gender as a social institution is an approach to understanding, not a declaration of truth (Wagner 1992 as cited in Collins 1998). Taking this step directs the study of gender; it does not tell us what to find. Framing gender as an institution will make it more commensurable for linking to other institutions including the traditional “substantive” ones but also race/ethnicity, social class, heterosexuality/sexuality, and age, among others (Ferree & Hall 1996). Social theory can be used to stifle dissent or for positive change (Burawoy 1998; Collins 1998). Framing gender as an institution promises positive change within and beyond the academy in making gender’s social character and dynamics more visible.<sup>16</sup>

## Notes

1. The terms *institution*, *institutionalized*, and *institutionalism* are defined differently in different disciplines and subfields. I lack the space to address the issue here. See Katzenstein (1998) on social movements, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) on organizations,

and Hall and Taylor (1996) and March and Olsen (1989) on institutions and institutionalism in political science.

2. American Sociological Society was the name of the American Sociological Association at the time. Hughes's comment was published in the first issue of the *American Sociological Review* in 1936.

3. Gender scholars differ about whether society "needs" gender. Lorber (2000), for instance, says decidedly not, and Oyewumi (1997) points out that it is not a feature of all societies, whereas Gherardi (1995) says society does need gender. Exploration of this point, while important, exceeds the purview of this article.

4. Bellah and colleagues (1991:292) assert that because America's social institutions are "damaged," new and better ones must be developed to regain the nation's "institutional health."

5. Balzer (2003) cautions against framing social institutions as harmonious, positive, or beneficial by reminding scholars that some institutions inflict harm, as slavery did, for example. Furthermore, even if institutions are necessary for a group of people to function, they do not equally benefit all who participate in them.

6. This point is similar to one made recently by sociobiologist Wilson (1999), which says that social science will eventually wither away because it is not needed. Natural science will explain everything about human behavior that is worth explaining, and thus only "real science" and the arts are required to fully understand the human experience.

7. Since Parsons saw social sanctions as emanating from norms, rooted in values, the subjective aspect of institutions in essence becomes normative rules. From this point of view, one might link the subjective with what is sometimes called the ideational, provided one takes the ideational in the sense of shared cultural norms, rather than as something that varies idiosyncratically from individual to individual. In contrast, the objective is more like observable patterns of social action, although Parsons does not stress that, because, once he brings norms into focus, he tends to sideline real action patterns. Put most simply, breaking apart the elements woven together in previous conceptions of social institutions, Parsons equates the objective side of institutions with uniform modes of behavior and the subjective side with the culturally anchored normative sanctions that he sees as underpinning these modes of behavior.

8. Using this criterion, I would suggest that organized sports is a social institution whereas baseball is not (Bellah et al. 1991). Organized sports have existed for centuries in varying forms in many cultures, in most known societies — thus meeting the time and space distanciation criterion. Baseball as a particular kind of sport is relatively recent in time and is limited geographically, mostly to the U.S. Baseball is institutionalized according to several criteria we have noted, but its failure to meet them all undermines its status as a social institution properly so called.

9. Connell's theory of links between gender, sexuality, and the body has prompted a corpus of promising scholarship by sociologists (Rogers & Garrett 2002; Schrock, Reid & Boyd 2004), anthropologists (Kondo 1990), and management scholars (Calas & Smircich 1997; Collinson & Collinson 1996) that explores their interconnections, thereby enriching understanding of how material bodies are culturally and socially deployed, molded,

displayed, evaluated, and altered in various contexts. They also show how these dynamics reflect the gender institution. Connell's exploration of connections between sexuality and gender notes that although homosexual behavior has always been present in human societies, the category homosexual, like the categories prostitute, child, adolescent, and housewife, is a recent historical creation.

10. Shifts in gender patterns have also occurred in workplaces that are moving away from "all male" and "all female" jobs (Bielby & Baron 1986). Today's U.S. labor markets, while still segregated, have many gender-integrated jobs, an increasing number of which are gender-balanced (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993).

11. Although Lorber's claim is widely adopted by scholars worldwide, I have seen little discussion of its specific meanings or the consequences of adopting it. I suspect one feature contributing to its adoption is its superiority to the concept of "gender as structure." Institution's multifacetedness incorporates practices/behavior, social relations, interaction, cultural beliefs, norms, expectations, ideology, social policies, legal statuses and constraints, hierarchical power, and so on. Structure, in contrast, is narrower in scope and has problems with the dynamics of change.

12. With Acker (1992), Lorber says gender is embedded in all other institutions; yet unlike Acker, she says gender is an institution per se.

13. Historical-comparative work like Oyewumi's (1997) further shows the astereotypical results that come from an institutional perspective. Precolonial Yoruba society used age, not gender, to structure relationships and hierarchies.

14. To understand gendered practices and practicing, issues of agency, intention, and reflexivity must be unraveled (Ahearn 2000; Martin 2003).

15. Martin (2001) reports for work organizations that individuals "do gender" almost continuously whereas groups "mobilize gender" somewhat less continuously, a pattern documented by Thorne (1993) about children in school.

16. Framing gender as an institution also undermines dualisms (Giddens 1984; Lorber 1996, 1999, 2000), where one category of a pair is alleged to be "different" and of lesser value (Collins 1998; Epstein 1988). All distinctions are socially constructed, not "given" by biology, nature, inevitability, or divine decree, and awareness of this condition is useful.

## References

- Acker, Joan. 1990. "Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations." *Gender and Society* 4:139–58.
- . 1992. "Gendered Institutions: From Sex Roles to Gendered Institutions." *Contemporary Sociology* 21:565–69.
- Ahearn, Linda. 2000. "Language and Agency." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 30:109–37.
- Andersen, Margaret L., and Howard F. Taylor. 2000. *Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society*. Wadsworth/Thompson Learning.
- Balzer, Wolfgang. 2003. "Searle on Social Institutions." *Dialectica* 56:195–211.

- Barnes, Barry. 2001. "Practice As Collective Action." Pp. 17–28 in *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, edited by Theodore S. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina, and Eike Von Savigny. Routledge.
- Bellah, Robert N., Richard Marsden, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. 1991. *The Good Society*. Vintage Books.
- Benschop, Yvonne and Margo Brouns. 2003. "Crumbling Ivory Towers: Academic Organizing and Its Gender Effects." *Gender, Work, and Organization* 10:194–212.
- Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Anchor/Doubleday.
- Bielby, William T., and James N. Baron. 1986. "Men and Women at Work: Sex Segregation and Statistical Discrimination." *American Journal of Sociology* 91:759–99.
- Bird, Sharon R., and Leah K. Sokolofski. 2004. "Gendered Socio-Spatial Practices in Public Eating and Drinking Establishments in the United States." *Gender, Place and Culture* 7. In press.
- Borgatta, Edward, and Rhonda Montgomery (eds.). 2000. *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, 2d ed. Macmillan.
- Britton, Dana M. 2003. *At Work in the Iron Cage: The Prison As Gendered Organization*. New York University Press.
- Burawoy, Michael. 1998. "The Extended Case Method." *Sociological Theory* 16:4–33.
- Calas, Marta B., and Linda Smircich. 1997. "Predicando la Moral en Calzoncillos? Feminist Inquiries into Business Ethics." Pp. 50–79 in *Women's Studies and Business Ethics: Toward a New Conversation*, edited by Edward Freeman and Andrea Larson. Oxford University Press.
- Camic, Charles. 1990. "'Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions' by Talcott Parsons, with Prologue and Commentary." *American Sociological Review* 55:313–45.
- Clark, Candace. 1997. *Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life*. University of Chicago Press.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 1998. *Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Collinson, David, and Jeff Hearn. 1994. "Naming Men As Men: Implications for Work, Organization, and Management." *Gender, Work and Organization* 1:2–22.
- Collinson, Margaret, and David Collinson. 1996. "'It's Only Dick': The Sexual Harassment of Women Managers in Insurance Sales." *Work, Employment, and Society* 10:29–56.
- Connell, Robert. 1987. *Gender and Power: Society, the Person, and Sexual Politics*. Stanford University Press.
- Cooley, Charles Horton. [1909] 1962. *Social Organization*. Schocken.
- DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1991. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. University of Chicago Press.
- Due, Pernille, John W. Lynch, Bjorn Holstein, and Jens Modvig. 2003. "Socioeconomic Health Inequalities among a Nationally Representative Sample of Danish Adolescents: The Role of Different Types of Social Relations." *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health* 57:692–98.
- Epstein, Cynthia Fuchs. 1988. *Deceptive Distinctions: Sex, Gender, and the Social Order*. Yale University Press.

1270 / *Social Forces* 82:4, June 2004

- Ferree, Myra Marx, and Elaine Hall. 1996. "Rethinking Stratification from a Feminist Perspective: Gender, Race, and Class in Mainstream Textbooks." *American Sociological Review* 61:929–50.
- Ferree, Myra Marx, and Beth Hess. 2000. *Controversy and Coalition: The New Feminist Movement across Three Decades of Change*, 3d ed. Routledge.
- Fobes, Catherine V. 2004. "Maintaining the Gender Order: Preferring Men, Using Women in an Episcopal Campus Chapel, 1927–1949." *Review of Religious Research*. In press.
- Gerson, Kathleen. 2002. "Moral Dilemmas, Moral Strategies, and the Transformation of Gender: Lessons from Two Generations of Work and Family Change." *Gender and Society* 16,1:8–28.
- Gherardi, Silvia. 1995. *Gender, Symbolism and Organizational Cultures*. Sage Publications.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. University of California Press.
- Goffman, Erving. 1962. *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*. Aldine.
- Grindstaff, Laura. 2002. *The Money Shot: Trash, Class, and the Making of TV Talk Shows*. University of Chicago Press.
- Gubrium, Jaber F., and James A. Holstein. 2000. "The Self in a World of Going Concerns." *Symbolic Interaction* 23,2:95–115.
- Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44:936–57.
- Hamilton, Walton H. 1932. "Institution." Pp. 84–89 in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 8, edited by Edwin R.A. Seligman. Macmillan.
- Hansen, Karen V. 1994. *A Very Social Time: Crafting Community in Antebellum New England*. University of California Press.
- Hobhouse, L.T. [1924] 1966. *Social Development*. Allen & Unwin.
- Hughes, Everett C. [1936] 1971. "The Ecological Aspect of Institutions." Pp. 5–13 in *The Sociological Eye: Selected Papers*, edited by Everett C. Hughes. Aldine-Atherton.
- . [1942] 1971. "The Study of Institutions." Pp. 14–20 in *The Sociological Eye: Selected Papers*, edited by Everett C. Hughes. Aldine-Atherton.
- Johnson, Allan G. 2000. *The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology: A User's Guide to Sociological Language*, 2d ed. <[www.netLibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=1&bookid=44698](http://www.netLibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=1&bookid=44698)>
- Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod. 1998. *Faithful and Fearless: Moving Feminist Protest inside the Church and Military*. Princeton University Press.
- Kenney, Sally J. 1996. "New Research on Gendered Political Institutions." *Political Research Quarterly* 49:445–66.
- Kondo, Dorrine. 1990. *Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Factory*. University of California Press.
- Kruger, Helga, and Rene Levy. 2001. "Linking Life Courses, Work, and the Family: Theorizing a Not So Visible Nexus between Women and Men." *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 26,2:145–66.
- Leidner, Robin. 1991. "Serving Hamburgers and Selling Insurance: Gender, Work, and Identity in Interactive Service Jobs." *Gender and Society* 5:154–77.

- Lorber, Judith. 1994. *Paradoxes of Gender*. Yale University Press.
- . 1996. "Beyond the Binaries: Depolarizing the Categories of Sex, Sexuality, and Gender." *Sociological Inquiry* 66:143–59.
- . 1999. "Crossing Borders and Erasing Boundaries: Paradoxes of Identity Politics." *Sociological Focus* 32:355–70.
- . 2000. "Using Gender to Undo Gender: A Feminist Degendering Movement." *Feminist Theory* 1:101–18.
- Lukes, Steven. 1974. *Power: A Radical View*. Macmillan.
- MacIver, Robert M. 1928. *Community: A Sociological Study*, 3d ed. Macmillan.
- . 1936. *Society: Its Structure and Changes*. Farrar & Rinehart.
- Maier, Mark, and James W. Messerschmidt. 1998. "Commonalities, Conflicts, and Contradictions in Organizational Masculinities: Exploring the Gendered Genesis of the *Challenger* Disaster." *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 35:325–44.
- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. Free Press.
- Martin, Joanne, and Kathleen Knopoff. 1997. "The Gendered Implications of Apparently Gender-Neutral Theory: Re-reading Max Weber." Pp. 30–49 in *Women's Studies and Business Ethics: Toward a New Conversation*, edited by Edward Freeman and Andrea Larson. Oxford University Press.
- Martin, Patricia Yancey. 1996. "Gendering and Evaluating Dynamics: Men, Masculinities, and Management." Pp. 186–209 in *Men As Managers, Managers As Men: Critical Perspectives on Men, Masculinities, and Management*, edited by David Collinson and Jeff Hearn. Sage Publications.
- . 2001. "'Mobilizing Masculinities': Women's Experiences of Men at Work." *Organization* 8:587–618.
- . 2003. "'Said and Done' vs. 'Saying and Doing': Gendering Practices, Practicing Gender at Work." *Gender and Society* 17:342–66.
- Martin, Patricia Yancey, John Reynolds, and Shelley Keith. 2002. "Gender Bias and Feminist Consciousness among Lawyers and Judges: A Standpoint Theory Analysis." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 27:665–701.
- McGinley, Ann C. 2004. "The Persistence of Inequalities: Masculinities at Work." Unpublished ms., College of Law, University of Nevada at Las Vegas.
- Mennino, Sue Falter, and April Brayfield. 2002. "Job–Family Trade-offs: The Multidimensional Effects of Gender." *Work and Occupations* 29:226–56.
- Messerschmidt, James W. 2000. *Nine Lives: Adolescent Masculinities, the Body, and Violence*. Westview.
- Messner, Michael. 1992. *Power at Play: Sports and the Problem of Masculinity*. Beacon Press.
- Nisbet, Robert A. 1953. *The Quest for Community*. Oxford University Press.
- Oyewumi, Oyeronke. 1997. *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Parboteeah, K. Praveen, and John B. Cullen. 2003. "Social Institutions and Work Centrality: Explorations beyond National Culture." *Organization Science* 14:137–48.

- Pierce, Jennifer. 1995. *Gender Trials: Rambo Litigators and Mothering Paralegals*. University of California Press.
- Quadagno, Jill, and Catherine Fobes. 1995. "The Welfare State and the Cultural Reproduction of Gender: Making Good Girls and Boys in the Job Corps." *Social Problems* 42:171–90.
- Reskin, Barbara F. 1988. "Bringing the Men Back In: Sex Differences and the Devaluation of Women's Work." *Gender and Society* 2:58–81.
- . 2003. "Including Mechanisms in our Models of Ascriptive Inequality." *American Sociological Review* 68:1–21.
- Ridgeway, Cecilia. 1997. "Interaction and the Conservation of Gender Inequality." *American Sociological Review* 62:218–35.
- . 2001. "Gender, Status, and Leadership." *Journal of Social Issues* 57:637–55.
- Ridgeway, Cecelia, and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1999. "The Gender System and Interaction." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25:191–216.
- Risman, Barbara. 1998. *Gender Vertigo*. Yale University Press.
- Rogers, Mary, and C.D. Garrett. 2002. *Who's Afraid of Women's Studies? Feminisms in Everyday Life*. Altamira Press.
- Roscigno, Vincent J. 2000. "Family/School Inequality and African American/Hispanic Achievement." *Social Problems* 47:266–90.
- Rosenfeld, Rachel. 2002. "What Do We Learn about Difference from the Scholarship on Gender?" *Social Forces* 81:1–24.
- Schatzki, Thomas, Karin Knorr-Cetina, and Eike Von Savigny (eds.). 2001. *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*. Routledge.
- Schippers, Mimi. 2002. *Rockin' Out of the Box: Gender Maneuvering in Alternative Hard Rock*. Rutgers University Press.
- Schrock, Doug, Lori Reid, and Emily Boyd. 2004. "Transsexuals' Embodiment of Womanhood: Embodying Gender and Transcending the Sex/Gender Distinction." Unpublished ms., Department of Sociology, Florida State University at Tallahassee.
- Schwalbe, Michael, Sandra Godwin, Daphne Holden, Douglas Schrock, Shealy Thompson, and Michelle Wolkomir. 2000. "Generic Processes in the Reproduction of Inequality: An Interactionist Approach." *Social Forces* 79:419–52.
- Searle, John. 1969. *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge University Press.
- . 1995. *The Construction of Social Reality*. Free Press.
- Simon, Robin W., and Leda E. Nath. 2004. "Gender and Emotion in the United States: Do Men and Women Differ in Self-reports of Feelings and Expressive Behavior?" *American Journal of Sociology* 109:1137–76.
- Sumner, William Graham. [1906] 1979. *Folkways and Mores*, edited by Edward Sagarin. Schocken.
- Thorne, Barrie. 1993. *Gender Play: Girls and Boys in School*. Rutgers University Press.
- Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald. 1993. *Gender and Racial Inequality at Work: The Sources and Consequences of Job Segregation*. ILR Press.
- Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald, and Sheryl Skaggs. 2002. "Sex Segregation, Labor Process Organization, and Gender Earnings Inequality." *American Journal of Sociology* 108:102–28.

- Tuomela, Raimo H. 2003. "Collective Acceptance, Social Institutions, and Social Reality." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 62:123–65.
- Wagner, David G. 1992. Daring Modesty: On Metatheory, Observation and Theory Growth. Pp. 199–220 in *Postmodernism and Social Theory*, edited by Steven Seidman and David Wagner. Blackwell.
- Waite, Linda, and E.L. Lehrer. 2003. "The Benefits from Marriage and Religion in the United States: A Comparative Analysis." *Population and Development Review* 29:255–76.
- West, Candace, and Sarah Fenstermaker. 1995. "Doing Difference." *Gender and Society* 9:8–37.
- West, Candace, and Don Zimmerman. 1987. "Doing Gender." *Gender and Society* 1:13–37.
- Williams, Robin M. Jr. 2000. "American Society." Pp. 1:140–48 in *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, 2d ed., edited by Edgar F. Borgotta and Rhonda J. V. Montgomery. Macmillan.
- Wilson, Edward O. 2001. *Consilience*. Knopf.