Moderator: Sam Rickless
Office: Dodd 287
Telephone: 644-0218
Office Hours: TBA
E-mail: srickles@mailer.fsu.edu
Tutorial Objectives
To understand the issues and debates within contemporary epistemology.
Readings
[R]: On Reserve at Strozier Library.
[H]: In Henderson. Henderson materials may be photocopied
in the Main Office.
ANTHOLOGIES
EKJ: Pappas, G.S. and M. Swain, eds. 1978. Essays on
Knowledge and Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[R]
JK: Pappas, G.S., ed. 1979. Justification and Knowledge:
New Studies in Epistemology. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing
Company. [R]
NE: Kornblith, H., ed. 1985. Naturalizing Epistemology.
Cambridge: MIT Press. [R]
EKR: Moser, P.K., ed. 1986. Empirical Knowledge: Readings
in Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
[R]
APK: Moser, P.K., ed. 1987. A Priori Knowledge.
New York: Oxford University Press. [R]
CRE: Goodman, M.F. and R.A. Snyder, eds. 1993. Contemporary
Readings in Epistemology. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
[R]
The following books may be available at the FSU Bookstore and/or Bill's Bookstore:
APK and CRE.
Bonjour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Stroud, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1. Theories of Knowledge
A. Foundationalist Internalism
* Chisholm, R. 1982. The Foundations of Knowing, Chapter
1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. [H]
* Plantinga, A. 1988. "Chisholmian Internalism." In Philosophical
Analysis: A Defense by Example, ed. D. Austin (Dordrecht: Reidel),
137-44. [H]
* Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate, Chapters
1-2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [R]
B. Coherentist Internalism
* Lehrer, K. 1974. Knowledge, Chapters 1, 7 & 8. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. [R]
* Bonjour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,
Chapters 5-8. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [R]
* Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate, Chapters
4-5. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [R]
C. Externalism: Reliabilism and Quasi-Reliabilism
* Alston, W. 1985. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification." Monist
68, no. 1. In EKR and in Epistemic Justification: Essays
in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
[R]
* Alston, W. 1988. "An Internalist Externalism." Synthese
74, no. 3. In Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of
Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). [H]
* Dretske, F. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information,
Chapter 4. Cambridge: MIT Press. [H]
* Goldman, A. 1979. "What is Justified Belief?" In JK,
EKR, and CRE. [R]
* Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate, Chapter
9, Sections I, II, and III-A). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[R]
* Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations, Chapter
3, Section 1 ("Knowledge"). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press: 172-96. Part (172-85) in CRE. [R]&[H]
* Shope, R.K. 1984. "Cognitive Abilities, Conditionals, and
Knowledge: A Response to Nozick." Journal of Philosophy 81: 29-41
(sections I and II). [H]
2. The Gettier Problem
* Gettier, E. 1963. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis
23. In EKR and CRE. [R]
* Dretske, F. 1971. "Conclusive Reasons." Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 49: 1-22. In EKJ. [R]
* Pappas, G. S. and M. Swain. 1973. "Some Conclusive Reasons
against 'Conclusive Reasons'." Australasian Journal of Philosophy
51: 72-76. In EKJ. [R]
* Goldman, A.I. 1967. "A Causal Theory of Knowing." Journal
of Philosophy 64: 355-72. In EKJ and CRE.
[R]
* Goldman, A.I. 1976. "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge."
Journal of Philosophy 73: 771-91. In EKJ. [R]
* Lehrer, K. and T. D. Paxson, Jr. 1969. "Knowledge: Undefeated
Justified True Belief." Journal of Philosophy 66: 225-37. In EKJ.
[R]
* Sosa, E. 1970. "Two Conceptions of Knowledge." Journal of
Philosophy 67: 59-66. [H]
* Lehrer, K. 1979. "The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge."
In JK and CRE. [R]
3. Scepticism
* Descartes, R. 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy,
Meditation I. Trans. by J. Cottingham.
* Austin, J. L. 1946. "Other Minds." Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volume XX. Reprinted in Philosophical
Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). [H]
* Moore, G. E. 1939. "Proof of an External World." Proceedings
of the British Academy, Volume XXV. Reprinted in Philosophical
Papers (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959). [H]
* Moore, G. E. 1959. "Certainty." In CRE and in
Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959).
[R]
* Stroud, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism.
Chapters 1-3. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [R]
* Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Chapter
3, Section 2 ("Skepticism"). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press: 197-217. In CRE. [R]
* Forbes, G. 1984. "Nozick on Scepticism." Philosophical Quarterly
34: 43-52. [H]
4. Naturalized Epistemology
* Quine, W. V. O. 1960. Word and Object, Chapter 1.
[H]
* Quine, W. V. O. 1969. "Epistemology Naturalized." In NE,
EKR, CRE, and Ontological Relativity and
Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press). [R]
* Quine, W. V. O. 1974. The Roots of Reference, Section
1 ("Reception and Perception"). Lasalle: Open Court. [H]
* Stroud, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism,
Chapter 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [R]
* Kim, J. 1988. "What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology'?" In CRE
and in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 2: Epistemology,
ed. J. Tomberlin (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company).
[R]
5. A Priori Knowledge
* Kant, I. 1787. Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction,
Sections I-V. [H]
* Ayer, A. J. 1936. "The A Priori." In APK and
in Language, Truth and Logic, Chapter 4 (London: Victor Gollancz).
[R]
* Chisholm, R. 1977. "The Truths of Reason." In APK and
in Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition, Chapter 5 (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall). [R]
* Kripke, S. 1972. "A Priori Knowledge, Necessity, and Contingency."
In APK (selections from Naming and Necessity).
[R]
6. Background/Optional Readings
A. Background Material in the Useful Anthologies
* Dretske, F. 1983. "Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information."
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6: 55-63. In NE.
[1-C]
* Pappas, G. S. and M. Swain, eds. 1978. "Introduction," Sections
1-4. In EKJ. [2]
* Kornblith, H. 1985. "Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?"
In NE. [4]
B. Useful Background/Introductory Material
* Dancy, J. and E. Sosa, eds. 1992. A Companion to Epistemology.
Oxford: Blackwell.
* Pojman, L. P. . What
Can We Know: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge.
* Pojman, L.P. 1993. The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and
Contemporary Readings. Belmont: Wadsworth.
* Steup, M. 1996. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology.
Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall.
C. Influential Books and Collections of Articles
* Alston, W. 1989. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory
of Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
* Audi, R. 1988. Belief, Justification, and Knowledge.
Belmont: Wadsworth.
* Bender, J. W. 1989. The Current State of the Coherence Theory:
Critical Essays on the Epistemic Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence
Bonjour, with Replies. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
* Kripke, S. 1972/1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
* Lehrer, K. 1974. Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
* Lehrer, K. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview
Press.
* Moser, P. 1989. Knowledge and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
* Pollock, J. 1986. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.
Savage: Rowman & Littlefield.
* Shope, R. 1983. The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
* Sosa, E. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Requirements
* Tutorial attendance is mandatory. If, by virtue of factors beyond your control, you cannot attend a particular tutorial, you should inform the moderator of the fact ahead of time.
* Each tutorial will open with a short student presentation on the reading for that week.
* One 2-3 page paper per week, for the first 11 weeks. Each paper must be handed out or e-mailed to all tutorial participants and must be e-mailed to the tutorial moderator at least 24 hours before the start of the following week's tutorial. The purpose of each paper is to summarize the philosophical views and arguments put forward in the readings for that week. The papers will not be graded.
* A preliminary examination will be offered in Week 13.
The examination will be based on the ENTIRE reading list in this syllabus,
not solely on the material covered in tutorial. The course grade
(S/U) will be based entirely on the results of the preliminary examination
(including the oral, if needed). Please consult the Philosophy Department
Graduate Handbook for further details.
Notes
The tutorial readings and requirements stated above are subject to change.